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ABSTRACT: In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that 
knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be 
problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. 
In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge 
the gap between Mizrahi’s proposal and Sankey’s objections. 
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1. Summarizing the Discussion 
Moti Mizrahi puts forth the following argument for epistemic certainty, an 
argument which relies on the standard notion of factivity: 
1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e. 
2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain. 
3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p 
epistemically certain.1 
Since p cannot be false given e, epistemic certainty can be understood as a property 
of propositions rather than of rational agents. 
Mizrahi accepts the normative role that evidence plays in determining 
whether a belief should count as knowledge. He writes: 
The fact that a truth is difficult for people to accept is not evidence against it. 
Some religious believers find it difficult to accept the theory of evolution by 
natural selection, since they think that the theory is inconsistent with their 
religious beliefs. But the mere fact that those religious believers find it difficult to 
accept the theory of evolution by natural selection is not evidence against the 
                                                        
1 Moti Mizrahi, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” Logos & 
Episteme X, 2 (2019):  225. 
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theory itself.2 
Furthermore, he rejects at least a variety of fallibilism, arguing that if we accept 
(3), we are committed to e securing knowledge that p.3 
Howard Sankey objects that Mizrahi’s argument “does not in fact proceed 
from the factivity of knowledge to knowledge being epistemic certainty.”4 
Specifically, Sankey critiques (1). It is not, as Mizrahi claims, a premise about 
factivity, but rather, “[i]t is a claim about the relation between grounds (or 
evidence) and knowing.”5 The nature of that relationship is, as he notes, unclear. 
As he points out, the only thing really necessary for knowledge is truth. 
In his reply to Sankey, Mizrahi agrees with Sankey that it is not possible to 
know a proposition that is false. However, unjustified propositions are also 
unknowable, Mizrahi notes. “[I]f S knows that p, then p must not only be true but 
also justified.”6 In other words, justification is implicit in claims to knowledge. 
Mizrahi then restates his argument without the appeal to e. 
In Sankey’s reply to Mizrahi’s reply, he interprets Mizrahi’s defense as 
claiming that “[i]t is not just that knowledge is factive, but that it is factive and 
requires justification” and that “Mizrahi takes the fact that knowledge requires 
both truth and justification to entail that justification must guarantee truth.”7 
Tracing Mizrahi’s argument, Sankey concludes that the level of justification 
required to conclude knowledge can be no less than certainty, a conclusion he 
finds problematic, for this would require that justification guarantee truth. He 
argues further that Mizrahi’s contracted argument also fails, and that in the 
absence of a valid argument, we should assume that the infallibilist view of 
justification should not be believed. 
An additional, though distinct, critique is offered by James Simpson. He 
argues that (2) of Mizrahi’s original argument is false. To show why he thinks it is 
false, he presents the following scenario. 
Math. Suppose my mathematician dad, an honest and reliable fellow, tells me that 
2+2=4. On this basis, I come to believe that 2+2=4.8 
                                                        
2 Ibid, 226. 
3 Ibid, 227. 
4 Howard Sankey, “Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi,” Logos & Episteme X, 3 (2019): 
333. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, 444. 
7 Howard Sankey, “Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth? Reply to Mizrahi,” Logos & 
Episteme X, 4 (2019):  446. 
8 James Simpson, “Knowledge Doesn’t Require Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Mizrahi,” Logos 
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“2+2=4” is a necessary truth but, as Simpson argues, believing that “2+2=4” on the 
basis of testimony, even if that testimony is from an honest and reliable person, 
does not guarantee the truth of “2+2=4.” If this is the case, then (2) of Mizrahi’s 
argument fails. 
2. Resolving Simpson’s Objection 
Before proceeding let’s clear out Simpson’s objection. He argues that in the case of 
a necessary truth like “2+2=4,” believing it is true on the basis of reliable testimony 
is not enough to guarantee its truth, and thus it fails to be epistemically certain. 
However, Simpson himself notes that “what guarantees the truth of 2+2=4 isn’t my 
dad telling me, in Math, that it’s true that 2+2=4. It’s that, in fact, 2+2=4.”9 He is 
right about this. But let’s take this a step further: it is not possible that I could 
justifiably believe that “2+2=4” on the basis of my dad’s testimony. Why is this the 
case? “2+2=4” is analytically true. When I understand the content of the 
proposition “2+2=4,” I should immediately understand that it is true. In Math, 
when my dad transmits to me the proposition “2+2=4,” if I understand the content 
of the proposition, then I immediately understand that it is true, without reference 
to the testimonial chain that led to my introduction to the proposition. In fact, the 
testimonial chain plays no normative role in regulating my belief and knowledge 
that “2+2=4.” Simpson’s objection to (2), then, is problematic. 
3. What about Normativity Instead of Certainty?: A Rapprochement 
As mentioned above, Mizrahi characterizes epistemic certainty as a property of 
propositions rather than of rational agents. A proposition is epistemically certain if 
a justification e is such that it guarantees that a rational agent S knows that p. One 
of Sankey’s main quibbles with Mizrahi’s argument is “Mizrahi takes the fact that 
knowledge requires both truth and justification to entail that justification must 
guarantee truth.”10 Sankey reacts against the kind of infallibilism promoted by 
Mizrahi’s argument because he is skeptical about the nature of the relation 
between knowledge, justification, and truth. Specifically, he wonders whether 
justification should be included in our understanding of factivity. In what follows, 
I want to suggest a rapprochement between the Mizrahi’s and Sankey’s positions. 
Contra Mizrahi, I want to make the case that what we should really care about is 
the normativity of justification, rather than epistemic certainty. Contra Sankey, I 
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argue that justification is important to factivity and I give a brief account of how 
justification can play this role. 
Standard factivity, which is what I will call the notion of factivity that has 
been assumed in this debate, is treated axiomatically in various formal logics. For 
instance, knowledge is represented as 
Kaφ→φ11 
which is the built out from the standard modal factivity axiom φ→φ. The 
knowledge formula is read informally as “if an agent a KNOWS that φ, then it is 
the case that φ.” Knowledge implies truth, and truth is required for knowledge. 
Hintikka12 was among the first to use modal logics to express epistemic 
notions like the one in the previous paragraph. From his and others’ formalizations 
into epistemic logic, Artemov and Fitting13 developed a formal logic, Justification 
Logic, to help track the role that justifications play in knowledge ascriptions. Their 
Justification Logic builds on standard epistemic logic by “unfolding” the modal 
operator  as the justification variable, t. For a logical formula P, the statement “t 
justifies P” is represented as t: P. The axioms familiar to modal logic have 
counterparts in Justification Logic. The axiom of modal logic F→F, read as “if it 
is necessarily the case that F, then F” Artemov and Fitting call the “Factivity 
Axiom” in Justification Logic. Consistent with the project of unfolding the 
necessity operator, , of modal logic, the Factivity Axiom is stated as 
Factivity Axiom:  t: F→F 
How do Artemov and Fitting understand justification in relation to 
knowledge and, hence, truth? Let’s call their position justification factivity, and it 
is characterized (at least partially) as follows: “Factivity states that justifications are 
sufficient to conclude truth.”14 They add elsewhere: 
Factivity is a strong assumption: justifications cannot be wrong. Nonetheless, if 
the justification is a mathematical proof, factivity is something mathematicians 
                                                        
11 Rasmus Rendsvig and John Symons, “Epistemic Logic,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2019 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 
2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/logic-epistemic/: §2.6. 
12 Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
13 Sergei Artemov and Melvin Fitting, “Justification Logic,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/logic-justification/; Sergei Artemov 
and Melvin Fitting, Justification Logic: Reasoning with Reasons, Cambridge Tracts in 
Mathematics 216 (Cambridge, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
14 Artemov and Fitting, “Justification Logic,” §2.5. 
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are generally convinced of. If we think of knowledge as justified, true belief, 
factivity is built in. Philosophers generally understand justified, true belief to be 
inherent in knowledge, but not sufficient.15 
Now, as Artemov and Fitting are quick to note, Justification Logic does not 
capture the whole of the discussion on justification in traditional epistemology. 
Standard discussions in epistemology about justification are often “from the ground 
up,” i.e., concerned with how we can move from justification to knowledge. 
Justification Logic, on the other hand, is a “from the top down” approach: how can 
we characterize justification in actual cases of knowledge? Furthermore, 
Justification Logic, while providing a formalization of justification, “does not 
directly analyze what it means for t to justify [a formula] F beyond the format t:F, 
but rather attempts to characterize this relation axiomatically.”16 But Justification 
Logic is useful insofar as it attempts to formalize and structure the reasoning 
implicit in deliberations about justified belief. 
How, then, can we analyze t:P in terms of standard epistemological 
discourse? Let’s explore two options here. First, since t represents the unfolding of 
the K operator in epistemic logic (which is itself and unfolding of the necessity 
operator  of modal logic), t:P is simply another way of representing KP (i.e., “t 
justifies P” is the analysis of “P is known” in Justification Logic). t:P, then, is just 
one way of representing knowledge. 
Option two is this. Call t the justificans and P the justificandum. t:P 
formalizes a basic assumption of the justifies relation between the justificans and 
justificandum, namely that it is a necessary relation. One may find this claim to be 
jolting. But by axiomtically characterizing the relation between the justificans and 
justificandum as necessary, Justification Logic is simply stipulating that that 
relation is necessary. As an axiom, we can’t really prove that it is the case that 
relation is necessary. However, it does seem both possible and desirable to show 
that this relation coheres with our normal understanding of justification. The 
necessary relation between the justificans and the justificandum is related to our 
believing that P on the basis of t. We can characterize this variously depending on 
the type of justification we have in mind. The situation is fairly straightforward on 
doxastic nonvoluntarism, e.g., reliablism, which is one way to characterize A’s 
justification for her belief that P.  
Consider the following scenario, borrowed from Jennifer Lackey. 
PERCEPTION: Estelle, Edwin, and I, who have been roommates for the past eight 
                                                        
15 Artemov and Fitting, Justification Logic: Reasoning with Reasons, 24. 
16 Artemov and Fitting, “Justification Logic,” §2.1; cf. Artemov and Fitting, Justification Logic: 
Reasoning with Reasons, 1-2. 
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years, were eating lunch together at the dining room table in our apartment. 
When I asked Edwin to pass the wine to Estelle, he replies, “Estelle isn't here 
today.” Prior to this disagreement, neither Edwin nor I had any reason to think 
that the other is evidentially or cognitively deficient in any way, and we both 
sincerely avowed our respective conflicting beliefs.17 
“I” have a belief about Estelle’s being present at the table. This belief was formed 
on the basis of normal perceptual practice, i.e., sight and hearing, and my visual 
and auditory percepts of Estelle give rise to my belief that Estelle is present with 
us. The crucial point at this juncture is this: it is necessarily the case that given my 
visual and auditory percepts of Estelle that I believe that Estelle is present at the 
table. It simply could not be the case that I could have percepts consistent with 
believing that Estelle is present without believing that Estelle is present. If it were 
to happen that I have percepts of Estelle but fail to believe she is present, we would 
surely think that something is wrong with my cognitive processing and, hence, I 
would fail to be justified in my belief that Estelle is not present. This serves to 
show that we typically think of the relation between the justificans and 
justificandum as necessary. 
Voluntaristic views of belief-formation do not alter the picture radically. 
Suppose I am not sitting at the table with Edwin. I am in another room taking a 
nap while we wait for Estelle to arrive for dinner. She, Edwin and I plan to eat 
dinner and then go to a movie. I am awoken by the sound of the front door closing. 
I arise and enter the dining room, where I find two plates on the table and on the 
plates scrapes of food. On the coat rack I find a scarf that resembles Estelle’s scarf. 
Edwin is nowhere to be found. I consider the evidence: the sound of the door, the 
dinner plates, Estelle’s scarf. They ate dinner and left for the movie without me 
(and Estelle forgot her scarf)! On this evidential perspective, if my evidence e 
justifies my belief that P.  
One may object that in this scenario the evidence is polyvalent: since it is 
subject to alternate interpretations, the same evidence base may support another 
conclusion. It may be the case that after beginning dinner, they realized that there 
was no wine, so they quickly left to get more. Since it appears that belief that 
“Edwin and Estelle have left for the movies” (Pmovies) and “Edwin and Estelle have 
left to get more wine” (Pwine) both are supported by e, edoes not necessarily support 
Pmovies over Pwine. In other words, edoes not conclusively support my believing one 
over the other. But for present purposes, that e is not conclusive for Pmovies over 
                                                        
17 Jennifer Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social 
Epistemology, eds. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 306. 
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Pwine (or vice versa) does not change the picture: in both cases, e as a generic 
evidence base necessarily (though only partially) justifies both. That is really all 
that we’re after at this juncture. Of course, when deliberating about whether to 
believe Pwine or Pmovies, we acknowledge that evidence base e is incomplete. e will be 
necessary for whatever belief I end up forming, but I will need to gather additional 
evidence or make additional considerations over and above e to support belief that 
Pmovies over Pwine, and vice versa. e will not do the work by itself. Both Pmovies and 
Pwine have conclusive evidence bases, emovies in the case of Pmovies and ewine in the case 
of Pwine. Both include e but include other crucial pieces of evidence such that, 
taken together, they become necessary and sufficient to conclude that Pmovies or 
Pwine. 
Thus, when an evidence base is complete, that evidence base necessarily 
justifies belief that P. If we want to be voluntarists about belief, my possession of 
evidence base e does not guarantee that I in fact believe that P; but it would seem 
to be the case that my possessing evidence base e obligates me to believe that P, 
such that failure for me to believe P is a failure for me to meet my epistemic duties. 
It seems to me that part of the issue is Mizrahi, in characterizing certainty as 
a property of propositions and not of agents, does not attend to the role that this 
characterization ought to play in the epistemic deliberations of agents. 
